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Abstract 
 As a respond to the development of Internet and Digital technologies, EU listed 
creation of Digital Single Market (hereinafter referred to as: “DSM”) as a strategic goal. The 
development of DSM would contribute in securing competitiveness within the Union. 
Establishment of DSM inevitably raises an issue of data management in the EU and in order 
to successfully form DSM, EU needs to create a harmonious and uniformly applicable legal 
data protection framework. Data protection framework was created by adoption of Data 
Protection Directive in 19951 (hereinafter: “Directive 1995”). Directive 1995 was framed to 
the specific needs of the market that were matter of concern in 1995, but recent development 
had shown that Directive 1995 cannot answer nor resolve all the current issues. As a step in 
improving data protection framework, EU has adopted a GDPR2. In preamble of the GDPR it 
is emphasized that “legal and practical certainty for natural persons, economic operators 
and public authorities should be enhanced”.3 This thesis will evaluate capabilities of GDPR 
in achieving this aim. In addition, it is aiming to discover potential issues that may arise in 
the application of GDPR. 
The thesis will be divided in two sections: The first section covers issue of GDPR regarding 
long list of derogations left at the competence of Member States. Due to the page constraints 
of the thesis, the focus will be only on those derogations that can significantly impede the 
objectives of GDPR. Additionally, in the first section author will talk about the different legal 
instrument used by EU in creation of data protection framework and difference between 
regulation and directive. 
Second section of the paper will try to discover how uncertain it is going to be to 
enforce the rights provided by GDPR due to the possibilities of derogations mentioned in the 
first section of the paper. Focus will be on two practical issues, (a) the content data expressed 
by the users of social networks acting outside of the scope of household activities, and (b) 
enforcement of the right to be forgotten in national courts after Google Spain case.  
                                                 
1 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995] OJ L-
281/31 
2 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection 
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016]  OJ L 119/1 
3 Reg 2016/69 OJ L 119/2 
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The thesis concludes by drawing the conclusions from the section one and section two 
which evaluate the effect of the GDPR in creation of harmonious legal data protection 
framework across EU.  
Introduction 
One of EU’s listed priorities is the establishment of DSM within the European Union4. 
DSM is defined as “one in which the free movement of persons, services and capital is 
ensured and where the individuals and businesses can seamlessly access and exercise online 
activities under conditions of fair competition, and a high level of consumer and personal 
data protection, irrespective of their nationality or place of residence”.5 The purpose of 
DSM is to create an environment in which consumers and economic operators are going to be 
able to fully access to the goods and services without fear of infringement of any of their 
rights and in case of infringement of such rights, they will be able to fully enforce their rights. 
In order to successfully establish DSM, EC has identified three policy areas or “pillars” 
which require additional regulation: “Better access for consumers and businesses to online 
goods”6, “The right environment for digital network and services”7 and “Economy and 
Society”8. As a part of regulating mentioned specific pillars, EU identified the creation of 
European Union Data Protection Laws as area of significant importance. Brief background 
about the data protection laws will be discussed in the next paragraphs.  
EU Data Protection laws were first adopted in 1995 as a response to the fast growing 
internet services at that time. Having in mind the difference in levels of protection of rights 
and freedoms of individuals, but most notably the right of privacy, and as this difference may 
create an obstacle to the free market9 EU institutions, but more precisely The Council of the 
EU and European Parliament have adopted a Directive on the protection of individuals with 
                                                 
4 'Priorities' (European Commission - European Commission, 2017) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities_en> accessed 23 May 2017 
5 'Digital Single Market' (Digital Single Market, 2017) <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/digital-
single-market> accessed 23 May 2017 
6 'Better Access For Consumers And Business To Online Goods' (Digital Single Market, 2017) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/node/78515> accessed 23 May 2017 
7 'Right Environment For Digital Networks And Services' (Digital Single Market, 2017) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/node/78516> accessed 23 May 2017 
8 'Economy & Society' (Digital Single Market, 2017) <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/node/78517> 
accessed 23 May 2017 
9 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995] OJ L-
281/31 
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regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data10 also 
referred to as “1995 Data Protection Directive”. According to the Union law, more precisely 
Article 288 of TFEU, the institutions of EU, in exercise of their competences, are able to 
adopt regulations, directives, recommendations and opinions.11 The legal instrument used to 
address the data protection issues is a “directive”. As opposed to regulation, directives 
provide more discretion to the MS who are required to interpret and transpose the directives 
in the national law12. Due to the fact that MS needs to interpret directive, there is a high 
possibility of different interpretation which in the end leads to the fragmentation of data 
protection law among MS. This leads to the increase in the administrative compliance costs 
and costs of adjustment to different technical setting for each MS, resulting in increased 
financial burden on the individuals as well as economic operators acting in the field of data 
protection. For that reason choice of regulation as a legal instrument would be much more 
appropriate in creation of unified and harmonious legal framework as regulation is having a 
general application within the EU, it does not require interpretation and transposition to 
national laws and it is binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all MS13. For that 
reason, choice of a regulation as legal instrument is indication of the necessity to harmonize 
certain area, in this case data protection laws.  
Due to the fast technological progress, Internet development, introduction of online 
business, the ability of consumers to acquire goods and services online, the 1995 Directive 
could not answer all the needs of the market. Development of Web 2.0 which in accordance 
with online Oxford dictionary is defined as “the second stage of development of the Internet, 
characterized especially by the change from static web pages to dynamic or user-generated 
content and the growth of social media”14. The creation of social networks has opened 
another possibility for individuals to expose themselves, new ways of sharing personal data 
through the social networks have become a part of everyday activities, moreover, the pace of 
technological change and globalization have changed the way the personal data is processed 
and acquired.15 EU has noticed these issues and identified them in the preamble of white 
                                                 
10 ibid 
11 Consolidated version of Treaty on functioning of European Union [2008] OJ C 326/171 
12 Consolidated version of Treaty on functioning of European Union [2008] OJ C 326/172 
13 Consolidated version of Treaty on functioning of European Union [2008] OJ C 326/171 
14 'Web 2.0 - Definition Of Web 2.0 In English | Oxford Dictionaries' (Oxford Dictionaries | English, 2017) 
<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/Web_2.0> accessed 23 May 2017 
15 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European economic and 
social committee and the Committee of the regions - Safeguarding Privacy in a Connected World A European 
Data Protection Framework for the 21st Century – COM/2012/09 final – paragraph 1 
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paper “Safeguarding Privacy in a Connected World - A European Data Protection Framework 
for the 21st Century”.16 The EU intervened in regulating this area in order to protect their 
citizens. This created the incentive for European Commission to engage more in adjustment 
of their policies within DSM, more precisely adoption of new data protection law.  
As a response to the issues listed above, which were confirmed by the EC in white 
paper “Safeguarding Privacy in a Connected World A European Data Protection Framework 
for the 21st Century”17, Council of European Union, European Commission and European 
Parliament adopted ‘Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal 
data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data 
Protection Regulation)’18. In accordance with the Article 94 of GDPR, the 1995 Directive 
will be repealed as of 25th of May 2018.19 The new GDPR will become a single law that is 
applicable in all MS of EU. The national laws of MS that are currently effective will be non 
applicable, due to primacy of EU law over the national law.20 The predominant aims of new 
GDPR are to ‘strengthen fundamental citizens’ rights and facilitate business by simplifying 
rules for companies in Digital Single Market’21. Secondly,  in accordance with the assessment 
provided by the European Commission, new GDPR ‘as a single law should do away with the 
current fragmentation and costly administrative burdens, leading to savings for businesses of 
around €2.3 billion a year’22. The most significant difference in terms of legislation of data 
protection is the change in the legal instrument, EU legislators decided to use regulation as a 
form of the legislation instrument. The difference between regulation and directive has been 
indicated in previous paragraph. The fact that EU decided to use regulation as a legal 
instrument is an indicator of the need to harmonize data protection framework. Choice of 
Regulations as a legal instrument is capable of creating unified and harmonious legal 
framework for the business and companies operating in the European Union, which was, as 
previously stated, one of the aims and objectives of Data Protection reform.  
                                                 
16 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European economic and 
social committee and the Committee of the regions - Safeguarding Privacy in a Connected World A European 
Data Protection Framework for the 21st Century – COM/2012/09 final 
17 ibid 
18 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection 
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016]  OJ L 119/1 
19 Reg 2016/679 OJ L 119/86 
20 Case C-6/64, Falminio Costa v. ENEL [1964] page 594. 
21 'Reform Of EU Data Protection Rules - European Commission' (Ec.europa.eu, 2017) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/reform/index_en.htm> accessed 12 May 2017. 
22 Ibid 
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The question that arises and that will be discussed in the thesis is whether the change 
of the legal instrument from directive to regulation is sufficient to bring about the desired 
harmonisation? Is the GDPR clear enough to achieve this aim? 
Section one 
Introduction 
Initially, the new GDPR in general has a long list of derogations from its provisions, 
which jeopardizes the unanimous and harmonious application of the GDPR. Derogations are 
defined, in accordance with online Oxford dictionary, as “exemptions from or relaxation of a 
rule of law”.23 The existence of derogations in the legislation is leaving a MS to be exempted 
from certain provision or section of law and it is usually under condition of protection of 
certain principles of EU law, generally the protection of fundamental rights and principle of 
proportionality. This means that even MS who derogate from certain rules are allowed to do 
so under requirement of respect of principles of proportionality and protection of fundamental 
rights. The issue with the derogation is that they create different rules in different MS which 
eventually develops non-harmonious legal framework which results in additional financial 
costs for Controllers24 of personal data, as they must adjust to the different set of rules in 
different Member States. Due to the space constraint the entire regulation cannot be 
considered in detail, for that reason the thesis will cover Article 6 (2) which relates to 
lawfulness of data processing, more precisely lawfulness of processing of personal data 
published by users of social networks who are acting outside of the household activity. 
Moreover, the thesis will cover Article 23 which restricts Data Subject25 rights and how the 
derogations create issues in uniform application of right to be forgotten26 defined by Article 
17 of GDPR. The thesis will take into consideration the application of right to be forgotten in 
national courts of MS as illustration of different application of Google Spain27 case, due to its 
vague and ambiguous terms. 
  
                                                 
23 'Derogation - Definition Of Derogation In English | Oxford Dictionaries' (Oxford Dictionaries | English, 2017) 
<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/derogation> accessed 23 May 2017 
24 Reg 2016/679 OJ L 119/33 
25 ibid 
26 Reg 2016/679 OJ L 119/43 
27 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos(AEPD) and 
Mario Costeja González [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 
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1. Derogations from lawful data processing  
Article 6 (2) of GDPR entitles a MS to “maintain” and “introduce” more detailed 
requirements to ensure “fair” and “lawful” processing of personal data, with regards to 
Article 6 (1) sub-sections (c) to (e)28. The issue in this section is the fact that Article 6 (1) (d) 
applies when “processing is necessary to protect vital interest of data subject or of another 
natural person.”29 Term “vital interest” is not defined by the GDPR and it is a very broad, 
ambiguous and generally applicable term. This may represent a serious issue for the data 
Controllers30. Term such as “vital interest” creates additional uncertainty in terms of 
interpretation of the law, which results in undermining one of the fundamental principles of 
EU – legal certainty. When harmonising certain legal fields, EU may choose different 
approaches, for example, EU may opt for exhaustive harmonisation31, minimum 
harmonisation32 and optional harmonisation33. Exhaustive (maximum) harmonisation means 
that EU is setting the standards and does not allow MS to go over these standards. This 
approach is useful for avoidance of “gold-plating”34 where the EU is trying to avoid over-
regulating certain area which leads to creation of unnecessary administrative compliance 
burden. On the other hand, minimum harmonisation approach tends to set the lowest 
standards and creates an obligation for a MS not to go below but allows MS to impose higher 
standards. In the Recital 10 of the 1995 Directive it stated that “...the approximation of those 
laws must not result in any lessening of the protection they afford but must, on the contrary, 
seek to ensure a high level of protection in the Community;”.35 It is reasonable to assume that 
Recital 10 implies that EU used minimum harmonization approach for regulation of data 
protection law. The issue of minimum harmonization approach lies in the ability of MS to 
impose higher standards of protection than those provided by the directive. The similar issue 
was in the application of Right to be forgotten where the CJEU left for the national courts to 
strike fair balance between, on the one hand, freedom of expression and right of privacy and 
protection of personal data, on the other.36 This led to the imposition of different levels of 
                                                 
28 Reg 2016/679 OJ L 119/36 
29 ibid 
30 See supra note 27 
31 Catherine Bernard, The Substantive Law Of The EU (5th edn, Oxford University press 2016) pg. 582 
32 Ibid – pg. 586 
33 Ibid 
34 'Glossary - European Commission' (Ec.europa.eu, 2017) <http://ec.europa.eu/smart 
regulation/guidelines/ug_chap8_en.htm> accessed 23 May 2017 
35 Dir 95/46/EC OJ L 281/32 
36 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos 
(AEPD) and Mario Costeja González [2014], ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 – paragraph 81 
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protection to the freedom of expression, and consequently different application and 
interpretation of right to be forgotten by national courts of MS. 
The thesis did not go into evaluation of specific national legislation that derived out of 
the 1995 Directive, but it went through the analysis of the application of Article 12 (b) of the 
1995 Directive which was legal ground for creation of “Right to be forgotten” in the Google 
Spain37 case. The analysis will include interpretation of national courts while striking a 
balance between freedom of expression, on one hand, and rights of privacy and protection of 
personal data, on the other. This analysis will be used as an example to illustrate issue with 
the use of vague and undefined terms such as one in the Article 6 (2) “vital interest”.   
2. Derogations of data subject rights 
The rights of data subjects are provided for in Chapter 3 of GDPR38. This paper will 
only cover the right to be forgotten which is provided by Article 17 of the GDPR which states 
that Data Subjects39 shall have right of erasure (Right to be forgotten)40. It is important to 
indicate that current Right to be forgotten originated from CJEU’s judgment in Google 
Spain41 case, where the CJEU said that ‘operator of a search engine is obliged to remove 
from the list of results displayed following a search made on the basis of a person’s name 
links to web pages, published by third parties and containing information relating to that 
person’42. The previous provision was reframed and set in Article 17 of GDPR but the issue 
that may arise in the interpretation of RTBF was provided by Article 23 of GDPR which 
provides a restriction on Data Subject Rights and states that ‘...Member State law to which the 
data controller or processor is subject may restrict by way of a legislative measure the scope 
of the obligations and rights provided for in Articles 12 to 22...’. Different laws of MS might 
create a different application of the Data Subject Rights provided by General Data Protection 
Regulation. This issue will be discussed more in depth in Section two of this paper.  
  
                                                 
37 See supra note 27 
38 Reg 2016/679 OJ L 119/39 
39 See supra note 25 
40 Reg 2016/679 OJ L 119/43 
41 See supra note 27 
42 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos(AEPD) and 
Mario Costeja González [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 - paragraph 88 
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Conclusion of section one 
To conclude, above-mentioned derogations are only some of the derogations provided 
by provisions of General Data Protection Regulation, in depth reading of it can reveal even 
more places where the competence to regulate was left on the Member State. Therefore the 
question that arises here is why did the legislator opt for a regulation as a legal instrument 
when in its very content it had created some type of a hybrid regulation-directive? Moreover, 
regulating data protection in the EU might result to the creation of additional financial burden 
or implications on the controllers due to the broad use of derogations. This section will be 
concluded with the following paragraph “However, the large number of derogations and 
their potential broad scope is likely to result in many international companies having to 
continue to deal with national data protection law variations across numerous Member 
States to ensure compliance with the varying EU data protection requirements.“43 
Section Two 
Introduction  
This section discusses the practical problems which may arise in application of GDPR 
concentrating on two issues, (a) issue of lawfulness of the content data expressed by the users 
of social networks acting outside of the scope of household activities, and (b) enforcement of 
the right to be forgotten in national courts after Google Spain44 case. The first issue will be 
evaluated from the point of view of users of social networks being data controllers. Second 
issue will be explored from the point of view of French and Dutch courts implementing right 
to be forgotten after Google Spain45, more precisely striking balance between freedom of 
expression, on one hand and right of privacy and protection of personal data, on the other and 
whether the issues in different application of right to be forgotten can be solved by newly 
framed Article 17 in relation to Article 23 of GDPR?  
  
                                                 
43 William Long and Francesca Blythe, 'Member States’ Derogations Undermine The GDPR' (Privacy laws& 
business United Kingdom report 2016) 
44 See supra note 27. 
45 ibid. 
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1. Content data expressed by the users of social networks acting outside the scope 
of household activities  
The development of Web 2.0, which is defined by online Oxford dictionary as “the 
second stage of development of the Internet, characterized especially by the change from 
static web pages to dynamic or user-generated content and the growth of social media”46 has 
created additional problems for the citizens and legal entities in EU47. The question that first 
arises is what happens if content generated by user is a personal data? Does that mean that 
users become data controllers? Article 2(2)(c) of GDPR answers the first question by 
defining material scope of regulation and stating that “This Regulation does not apply to the 
processing of personal data: ... (c) by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or 
household activity;”48 Then the question remains what does the term “household activity” 
means? The Court gave criteria in Lindquist49 case where it stated “That exception must 
therefore be interpreted as relating only to activities which are carried out in the course of 
private or family life of individuals, which is clearly not the case with the processing of 
personal data consisting in publication on the internet so that those data are made accessible 
to an indefinite number of people50”. So the Court said that publications to the indefinite 
number of people are not in the course of private or family life of individuals, therefore not 
under the household activity exemption. Does that mean that any post on social network that 
is labelled “Public51” is a post that is shared to indefinite number of people? If yes, then even 
the user of social network can be classified as data controller in the sense of GDPR. For the 
purpose of applicable law Data Controller is taken to mean ‘...the natural or legal person, 
public authority, agency or other body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the 
purposes and means of the processing of personal data...” Data Controllers as such are 
required by GDPR to certain set of obligations when processing personal data, specifically 
and for purpose of the thesis, Article 6 of GDPR – “Lawfulness of processing”52 and Article 
17 of GDPR “Right of erasure/right to be forgotten”. These issues are further elaborated in 
the thesis.  
                                                 
46 See supra note 23 
47 See Introduction paragraph 3 
48 Reg 2016/679 OJ L 119/32 
49 Case C-101/1 Lindquist [2003] ECLI:EU:C:2003:596 
50 Ibid paragraph 47 
51 'What Is Public Information? | Facebook Help Centre | Facebook' (Facebook.com, 2017) 
<https://www.facebook.com/help/203805466323736> accessed 16 May 2017 
52 Reg 2016/679 OJ L 119/36 
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a) Lawfulness of processing of personal data under consent 
Principles of processing personal data are defined by Article 5 of GDPR and first 
principle requires personal data to be ‘processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner 
in relation to the data subject (‘lawfulness, fairness and transparency’)”.53 The principle of 
lawfulness is further elaborated in Article 6 of GDPR.54 In order to fulfil this obligation, user 
of social network acting as a data controller needs to acquire consents of every data subject 
that is subject of his public social network post. In order for user of social network acting as a 
data controller to fulfil this obligation there must be a technical requirement set by social 
network service provider, which requires every public post to fulfil “consent” criteria. 
Additionally, if GDPR is applicable to the users of social networks as data controllers acting 
outside the scope of household activities then the latter shall enforce the rights of data 
subjects provided by GDRP. Right to erasure specified by Article 17 (1) (b) of GDPR entitles 
a data subject to have personal data removed/erased if it has withdrawn its consent for such 
processing55. This means that social user shall remove the personal data regarding another 
data subject if it does not have its consent. As this may be a burden on users of social 
networks as data controllers, this is also a burden on social network service providers. In 
order to create environment capable of lawful processing of data subjects personal data by 
users of social networks, social network service providers shall include “approval 
requirement”. Approval requirement can be used for processing of pictures containing more 
than one person. For example, Facebook has already implemented and is using a “face 
recognition technology”56, so it can be used to identify number of the persons on the picture 
and to require number of consents equal to the number of the persons recognized by the face 
recognition technology. The personal data that is subject of “approval requirement” can be 
under “pending” status as long as it does not fulfill the criteria. The next paragraph is 
exploring further the issues of lawfulness of processing personal data, specifically lawfulness 
of protection necessary for the protection of “vital interest”. 
  
                                                 
53 Reg 2016/679 OJ L 119/35 
54 See supra note 52. 
55 Reg 2016/679 OJ L 119/44 
56 'How Does Facebook Suggest Tags? | Facebook Help Centre | Facebook' (Facebook.com, 2017) 
<https://www.facebook.com/help/122175507864081?helpref=faq_content> accessed 11 May 2017. 
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b) Lawfulness of processing for protection of “vital interest” 
 
“Lawfulness of processing” is defined by Article 6 (1) of GDPR and it states that 
‘processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one of the following 
applies:”57 and in paragraph (d) it states that “(d) processing is necessary in order to protect 
the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person”.58 This paragraph has 
been a subject of discussion in Section one of the thesis from the perspective of being subject 
of derogation by the Member States under Article 6 (2) of GDPR. Requirement under Article 
6 (1) (d) can be subject of additional technical adjustments on behalf of social network 
service provider. For example, if public post published by user of social network acting as a 
data controller outside the scope of household activity does not fulfil consent criteria, then 
social network service provider shall allow an option to check whether it is in the “vital 
interest” of “another natural person” to publish the post. This is very costly burden on the 
social network service provider, especially due to the fact that Article 6 (1) (d) is subject of 
derogations and thus it is highly probable that it will be different among Member States. 
Potential issue that may arise out of protection of “vital interest” is that social network 
service providers will be acting as a body who is obliged to determine whether publication of 
certain Data subject’s59 personal data is in “protection of vital interest” of either “data 
subject” or “another natural person”60. Having an obligation on social service provider to act 
as body determining “protection of vital interest” is problematic from the perspective of 
human resources qualified for such decision. The problem of different interpretation of the 
term “vital interest” can create non-harmonious application of the GDPR. This can be a very 
costly burden on the social network services providers, but even more for the users of social 
network acting as data controllers outside of the household activity, as it is unreasonable to 
expect that every user posses necessary knowledge for performance of such task.  Additional 
obligation for the data controllers is requirement to inform data subjects about recipients of 
the personal data61. This obligation will be shortly elaborated in next paragraph with aim of 
illustrating irrationality of imposition of such obligation on users of social network as data 
controllers. 
  
                                                 
57 Reg 2016/679 OJ L 119/36 
58 ibid 
59 See supra note 25. 
60 See supra note 57. 
61 Reg 2016/679 OJ L 119/40 
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c) Information to be provided where personal data are collected from the data subject 
Article 13 (1) of GDPR requires controllers to provide certain information to the data 
subject whose data they are processing62. For the purpose of this section, we are going to talk 
about requirement under Article 13 (1) (e) which states that controller needs to inform data 
subject about “(e) the recipients or categories of recipients of the personal data, if any“63. 
Examination of this obligation from the perspective of user of social network acting as a data 
controller highlights the issue that it remains difficult and an unreasonable burden to require 
the data subject to be informed about the specific recipients of their personal data, as it can be 
anyone. The only idea that comes to author’s mind is to deliver a general message to data 
subject which states that publication is “Public” and can be seen by anyone. In the author’s 
opinion purpose of obligation imposed by Article 13 (1) of GDPR is to inform data subject 
about physical/legal entities that are processing their personal data and if this obligation will 
be fulfilled by stating that it can be seen by “anyone” than the very substance of the right is 
being jeopardized. Next paragraph will be exploring the obligation of data controllers to 
respect the rights of data subjects provided by GDPR, specifically right to be forgotten.  
d) Right to be forgotten under GDPR 
Right to be forgotten as provided by Article 17 of GDPR entitles data subject to erase 
personal data that is: “(a) the personal data are no longer necessary in relation to the 
purposes for which they were collected or otherwise processed; (b) the data subject 
withdraws consent on which the processing is based according to point (a) of Article 6(1), or 
point (a) of Article 9(2), and where there is no other legal ground for the processing; (c) the 
data subject objects to the processing pursuant to Article 21(1) and there are no overriding 
legitimate grounds for the processing, or the data subject objects to the processing pursuant 
to Article 21(2); (d) the personal data have been unlawfully processed; (e) the personal data 
have to be erased for compliance with a legal obligation in Union or Member State law to 
which the controller is subject; (f) the personal data have been collected in relation to the 
offer of information society services referred to in Article 8(1)“64. Having the obligation on 
the burden of user of social network acting as a controller is highly impracticable, for the 
same reason as it is impracticable to impose an obligation to interpret the term “vital interest” 
                                                 
62 Ibid 
63 Reg 2016/679 OJ L 119/41 
64 Reg 2016/679 OJ L 119/43 
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(lack of human resources capable of performing such task). This thesis will illustrate how 
difficult it is for the national courts to strike a balance between freedom of expression, on one 
hand and right of privacy and protection of personal data on the other, so having the same 
obligation on the user of social network seems irrational. The discussion about right to be 
forgotten and its application at national court's level will be in the second part of section two 
of this paper. The subject of discussion will be obligation of national courts to strike a 
balance between freedom of expression and right of privacy and protection of personal data. 
Difficulties of such task are related to the vagueness, ambiguousness and lack of clarity in 
performance of such task, which is the same potential issue with application of above-
mentioned articles of GDPR. 
The question that remains to be answered is whether social users acting as data controllers 
outside the scope of household activity are going to be data controllers in the sense of GDPR?  
One of the possible solutions for the issue of differentiation between user of social network 
acting as a controller was addressed in the paper written by Brendan Van Alsenoy & Joris 
Ballet & Aleksandra Kuczerawy & Jos Dumortier – “Social networks and web 2.0: are users 
also bound by data protection regulations?“, where authors of the paper introduced a notion 
of decision making power to the controllers. They are suggesting that “an entity must exercise 
at least some level of decision-making power with regards to both the purposes and means of 
a particular processing operation.”65 They are differentiating between purposes and means 
of processing, identifying user of social network as the one that exercises the decision-
making power over the purpose as every person has autonomy in choice of purpose for which 
they are publishing certain data and on the other hand technical means where the user does 
not enjoy free choice, so this portion of decision-making power lies on the social network 
service provider66. This approach was written in the context of 1995 Data Protection 
Directive but as it seems it was disregarded by legislators when they were adopting new 
GDPR even though in my opinion it would perfectly fit and resolve the issues explained and 
listed above.  
  
                                                 
65Brendan Van Alsenoy and others, 'Social Networks And Web 2.0: Are Users Also Bound By Data Protection 
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2.  Google Spain case and its application in national courts of Netherlands and 
France 
a) Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos67 
Facts 
 
Mr. Costeja filed a complaint at Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) 
against La Vanguardia, Google Spain and Google Inc. The complaint was based on the fact 
that when user types the name of Mr. Costeja in the Google search engine, the search results 
include two pages of La Vanguardia newspapers with articles about Mr. Costeja connected to 
his recovery of social security debts68. By the above-mentioned complaint Mr. Costeja 
requested from La Vanguardia to remove articles or to adjust them in such manner not to 
show any of his personal data and additionally he requested Google to remove or conceal the 
personal data from the search results. Mr. Costeja based his request on the fact that personal 
data are no longer relevant69. The complaint was upheld against Google but was rejected 
against La Vanguardia, and for that reason Google brought an action against APED.70 
Ruling of Google Spain case 
The Court in its ruling concluded that Google, as a search engine, is a controller of 
personal data within the meaning of 1995 Data Protective Directive71 and as such “in order 
to comply with the rights laid down in those provisions and in so far as the conditions laid 
down by those provisions are in fact satisfied, the operator of a search engine is obliged to 
remove from the list of results displayed following a search made on the basis of a person’s 
name links to web pages, published by third parties and containing information relating to 
that person, also in a case where that name or information is not erased beforehand or 
simultaneously from those web pages, and even, as the case may be, when its publication in 
itself on those pages is lawful.72” Google Spain created an avalanche of comments and 
articles from scholars about relation between Freedom of privacy and Protection of personal 
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data with Freedom of Expression within the EU, especially because of paragraph 99 where 
the Court said that “As the data subject may, in the light of his fundamental rights under 
Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, request that the information in question no longer be made 
available to the general public on account of its inclusion in such a list of results, those rights 
override, as a rule, not only the economic interest of the operator of the search engine but 
also the interest of the general public in having access to that information upon a search 
relating to the data subject’s name”73  
Freedom of privacy and Protection of Personal data are both listed in Charter of fundamental 
rights of European Union (hereinafter: “the Charter”), more precisely in Article 7 and Article 
8, respectively74. The Charter has equal legal value as the Treaty on function of European 
Union and Treaty on European Union75. Additionally, the Charter also provides in Article 11 
Freedom of expression and information76, which consists of the “freedom to hold opinions 
and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and 
regardless of frontiers“. In author’s opinion, provision 99 of the Google Case judgment77 is 
the one that creates the most problems for national courts. CJEU has given a greater legal 
value to the protection of Article 7 and 8 of the Charter compared to economic rights of 
operators and general interest in access to information. This provision serves as an indicator 
for balancing between rights of freedom of expression and right to privacy and protection of 
personal data. In author’s opinion and as it may be seen from the national court cases, the 
courts of MS have disregarded provision 99 and they have given a greater significance to the 
freedom of expression instead of supporting Article 7 and 8 of the Charter as it was stated in 
the ruling of Google Spain case.78 CJEU has additionally confused national courts with the 
provision 81 of the ruling where they stated that “...Whilst it is true that the data subject’s 
rights protected by those articles also override, as a general rule, that interest of internet 
users, that balance may however depend, in specific cases, on the nature of the information in 
question and its sensitivity for the data subject’s private life and on the interest of the public 
in having that information, an interest which may vary, in particular, according to the role 
played by the data subject in public life.”79 In this provision, CJEU has acknowledged the 
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provision 9980, but this had created a possibility for the national courts to disregard it on the 
grounds of protection of freedom of expression. In the author’s opinion this provision is 
slightly contradicting the provision 9981 as the latter strengthens rights of data subjects, more 
precisely their rights provided by Article 7 and 8 of the Charter, but then the provision, 81 
states that “nature of the information” shall be taken in consideration especially if the data 
subject is playing the role in “public life”. Both of these terms are vague, they lack clarity and 
thus create a possibility of non-harmonious application of the ruling. Precisely this is going to 
be discussed in the next sub-section of the thesis where author explores application of the 
Google Spain ruling in the cases before national courts of France and the Netherlands. 
 
b) Application of Google Spain ruling in national courts of the Netherlands and 
France 
With all of that being said, duty to respect the Charter, duty to respect Google Spain 
ruling82, national courts have faced difficulties in interpretation and application of right to be 
forgotten. The most difficult issue is successfully assessing and striking fair balance between 
the Freedom of privacy and Right to protect personal data with Freedom of expression, due to 
the lack of clarity of provisions of Google Spain case.83 It should be kept in mind, the 
obligation of “judicial authorities of the Member States, which are responsible for ensuring 
that Community law is applied and respected in the national legal system“.84 Also, it should 
be noted that the exclusive competence for the interpretation of the acts of EU institutions is 
left to the CJEU, under the Article 267 of TFEU.85 National courts of MS must be careful not 
to interfere with the exclusive competence of the CJEU by giving a different interpretation to 
the acts of EU institutions. The next following paragraphs will discuss the application of 
Google Spain ruling in the context of national courts of the Netherlands and France.  
The Netherlands 
Arthur van M. v. Google Netherlands and Google Inc86 
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In 2012 Dutch TV broadcasted hidden camera footage where a man, Arthur van M, 
was discussing with an assassin how to best kill competitors87. Dutch TV did not refer to full 
name of the person but referred only to the full first name and first letter of his last name88. 
The footage was later used as evidence in criminal case to convict Arthur van M and he was 
sentenced to 6 years imprisonment89. Additionally, his story was inspiration for Angel 
Engelbertink who wrote and published a book about it with the main character, who 
commissioned assassination, being called Arthur van M. Later on, Arthur van M requested 
Google to delist some of links displayed when searcher types his name90. Google refused to 
delist links which eventually resulted in Arthur van M starting a procedure at District Court 
of Amsterdam where he invoked the Google Spain case but District Court rejected his 
arguments, so he appealed to the Court of Appeals of Amsterdam.91  
Court of Appeals of Amsterdam started its reasoning by pointing out the fact that 
Arthur van M was prosecuted for the serious offence and confirms that he is convicted in the 
first instance court.92 Also, it emphasized the fact that public is already showing the interest 
in his case since the articles are being published93. The Court of Appeals also states that 
articles in search results are only displaying Arthur van M’s initials but not his full name94. 
So, users who search under his full name cannot claim with certainty that this is him, unless 
they know other information about him which will identify him personally95. Arthur van M 
argued that searchers can use a book written with the character who is named same as him to 
relate it to him, but the Court of Appeals disagreed and stated that book is a mix of fiction 
and facts and in book there was actual assassination commissioned by main character which 
is different than in real life and for that reason public cannot relate to him96.  The Court of 
Appeals of Amsterdam rejected all the claims stated by Arthur van M and he lost the case.  
When balancing between personal data protection right and freedom of expression, 
Court of Appeals of Amsterdam put more emphasize in the protection of freedom of 
expression. The decision of Court of Appeals is setting a low threshold for the public interest 
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requirement, as any person who commits a serious criminal offence can be seen as a person 
of public interest, the one only needs to be written about in the news. This is contrary to the 
standard set by the Google Spain ruling, more precisely standard set in the provision 99 
where the CJEU states that “that the interference with his fundamental rights is justified by 
the preponderant interest of the general public in having, on account of its inclusion in the 
list of results, access to the information in question”.97 The standard set in provision 99 of 
Google Spain ruling is that there has to be “preponderant” interest of general public, so the 
question is whether the mere publication of article in the media can constitute “preponderant 
interest of general public”? For the purpose of comparison and definition of term 
“preponderant”, thesis will explore the similar standard from civil case law. “Preponderance 
of evidence” standard in a civil law cases means that “more than 50% of evidences points to 
something”.98 Mere publication in the media thus cannot create a “preponderant interest of 
general public”. For example, the article can be published in the newspapers or internet portal 
that nobody reads, does that mean that “preponderant interest of general public” exists? On 
the other hand, one can argue that this low public interest standard is in accordance with 
Article 29 Working party99, where they stated in its „Guidelines on the implementation of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union judgment on “Google Spain and Inc v. Agencia 
Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González” C-131/12”, that 
when assessing delisting request DPA100 shall take into account whether the data is related to 
criminal offence, the seriousness of offence and time of the event101. It is also important to 
clarify that Article 29 Working Party issued a “guidance” which under EU law are not 
binding, but purely advisory102. The existence of Article 29 Working Group additionally 
bolsters non-harmonious interpretation, due to advisory non-binding character of its 
guidance. National courts of MS sometimes chose to follow their guidance and sometimes 
they do not. The issue of the preponderant standards illustrates different approach in the 
balancing between rights of personal data and freedom of expression and for that reason we 
                                                 
97 See supra note 69. 
98 'Preponderance Of The Evidence' (LII / Legal Information Institute, 2017) 
<https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/preponderance_of_the_evidence> accessed 5 May 2017 
99 Dir 95/46/EC OJ L 281/48 
100 Reg 2016/679 OJ L 119/65 
101 Article 29 Working Party - „Guidelines on the implementation of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
judgment on “Google Spain and inc v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja 
González” C-131/12” 14EN 225 adopted on 26 November 2014, pg 20 
102 Article 1 (1) of Rules of procedure of Working party on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data – adopted 15th of February 2010 
 22 
can conclude that national courts of the Netherlands are interpreting and applying Google 
Spain103 case differently.  
Ewald van Hamersveld v. Google Inc.104 
KPMG partner engaged in contract to build a house, after the house was finished he 
was not satisfied how it was done and refused to pay fee for additional works and late 
payments in amount of 200 000 EUR.105 The consequence of this refusal was change of locks 
in the house so KPMG Partner could not enter it. Eventually, he had to sleep in containers 
installed next to the house.106 The contractor and KPMP partner brought dispute before Dutch 
Arbitration Board for Building Industry and eventually settled on a fee in amount 60 000 
EUR.107 The additional issue arose when Dutch newspapers “De Telegraf” published 
newspapers with front-page stating “KPMG Top Executive Camps in Container”.108 KPMG 
partner invoked the right to be forgotten and requested Google to de-list “De Telegraf” 
articles which are displayed upon search of his name.109 Google refused to de-list stating that 
“the webpages contained information that is relevant, of public interest, and not out-
dated“.110 Consequently, KPMG partner initiated a proceeding against Google at District 
Court of Amsterdam asking the court to order Google to either de-list the web pages or to 
place these web pages on the bottom of the search results.111 He was claiming that it was 
harmful for his career as client usually search for him and they eventually end up reading 
about „container story“.112 Additionally, KPMG partner was claiming that this information is 
purely within its private life and for that reason shall not be as of general public interest.113  
The District Court of Amsterdam rejected the arguments made by KPMG partner. Reasoning 
of the court was more concentrated on the lawfulness of the search results instead of 
lawfulness of the content.114 Additionally, in its reasoning the court is emphasizing the 
correctness and accuracy of the information provided in the news and states for that reason it 
                                                 
103 See supra note 27 
104 European Court of Human Rights judgments on the right to freedom of expression - Bulletin LVIII: THE 
'RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN'  - 24 May 2015, pg 1 
105 1 Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev. 119 2015 
106 ibid 
107 1 Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev. 120 2015 
108 ibid 
109 Ibid 
110 ibid 
111 ibid 
112 ibid 
113 1 Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev. 120 2015 
114 1 Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev. 121 2015 
 23 
should not be erased.115 Moreover, the court is basing “relevance” of the information 
provided in article on the fact that media decided that the news is “newsworthy”.116 The mere 
fact that media decided to publish news cannot be taken as evidence that the same news are in 
the interest of public. There would be no request for erasure if the article was not published in 
the first place. Such low threshold is jeopardizing the very essence of the right to be 
forgotten, since according to the District Court of Amsterdam, every published article is 
“newsworthy”, and therefore it shall not be erased. Moreover, this is contrary to the Article 
29 Working Party Guidance on the application of Google Spain reasoning. Article 29 
Working Party recognizes the private life of public figures:  
„But as a rule of thumb, if applicants are public figures, and the information in 
question does not constitute genuinely private information, there will be a stronger 
argument against de-listing search results relating to them“117[emphasis added] 
The question that arises is why the Court of Amsterdam did not uphold the right of privacy of 
a KPMG partner who is not even a public figure while having in mind the obligation 
provided by the Article 7 of the Charter on Right of private and family life?118 Even if we 
assume that the KPMG partner was public figure, the information contained in the published 
article is from his private life and in accordance with the Guidance119 Google should have 
erased it. Also, the courts justification based on the lawfulness of the information is contrary 
to the Google Spain120 ruling, since in the paragraph 88, the CJEU explicitly states that “the 
operator of a search engine is obliged to remove from the list of results displayed following a 
search made on the basis of a person’s name links to web pages ... and even, as the case may 
be, when its publication in itself on those pages is lawful.“121 
When it comes to the Netherlands, we can see from the cases above that the Courts of 
the Netherlands are applying Google Spain ruling differently. The question that arises next is 
how can GDPR improve and unify the application? Apparently, all the arguments provided 
by the Courts of Netherlands can be read in the light of derogation provided by Article 23 of 
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GDPR, more precisely, Article 23 (1) (i) „the protection of the data subject or the rights and 
freedoms of others“.122 Protection of freedom of expression and right to receive information 
can be legitimate derogation under Article 23 (1) (i). The different interpretation of Google 
Spain ruling in national courts of the Netherlands results from the use of vague and 
ambiguous terms, such as “preponderant”.. This issue should have been tackled by GDPR in 
order to ensure unified application. The GDPR had to be as precise as possible without 
leaving any room for interpretation.  
After exploring the interpretation of national courts of the Netherlands, thesis will now 
discuss application of Google Spain ruling at the national courts of France.  
France  
Marie - France M. v. Google France and Google Inc.123  
The case concerned an applicant who requested from Google to de-list web pages containing 
information about applicant's commitment of fraud from 2006.124 The applicant requested to 
be delisted from Google search results displayed upon the search on basis of its name.125 
Google rejected the request on the grounds that it was in the interest of the public.126 After the 
second link appeared in the Google search results the applicant decided to bring Google to 
the proceeding before regional court (Tribunal de Grande Instance - TGI).127 
TGI noted, in its reasoning, the fact that „the applicant did not bring a case against the editor 
of the article did not deprive her of the right to request de-referencing directly from the 
search engine operator.“128 TGI granted a affirmative judgment for the applicant and ordered 
Google to remove the web pages containing information about the fraud from the search 
results based on applicant's name on the grounds that the article were published more than 8 
years ago.129 This case shows that the national courts of France are willing to suppress the 
freedom of expression on the grounds of the relevance and time of publication. As indicated 
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in the Article 29 Working Party Guidance130, the time of publication plays significant role 
when balancing between protection of personal data and freedom of expression.  
Franck J. v. Google France and Google Inc 131 
The case concerned applicant's request to delist news reports from Google search results, 
based on the name of applicant, which contain information about legal proceedings for 
harassment at work.132 The case was brought under urgent procedure before Toulouse 
Regional Court.133 The judgment in legal proceedings for harassment was delivered at court 
of first instance and it was accessible to public and also the facts about the case were from 
2011, which the court found to be still recent.134 The Toulouse Regional Court also noted the 
fact that even though the appeal was still pending it does not necessarily mean that court of 
first instance made a mistake and for that reason Toulouse Regional Court decided that „right 
of the public to be informed about a current legal case outweighed an individual’s ‘right to 
be forgotten’ and rejected the request for removal”.135 
In this section we can see that national courts of France are interpreting the Google Spain 
ruling differently than the Netherlands national courts. National courts of France are 
following a Guidance published by Article 29 Working Party136. On the other hand, the 
Netherlands national courts are, in author’s opinion, ruling contrary to the Article 29 
Working Party Guidelines on application of Google Spain ruling137 as in the case of Ewald 
van Hamersveld v. Google Inc they are ignoring the fact that the individual concerned was 
acting within its private life. This is not only disregarding the Guidance138, but the Charter 
too. As a reminder, GDPR is supposed to create a harmonious legal framework within EU, so 
we shall now examine what provisions within GDPR are going to address specific issue of 
application of Right to be forgotten? More precisely, we need to examine whether there are 
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any provisions which deal with rules applicable when it comes to the striking a balance 
between rights in question. In the Article 23 of GDPR which is regulating restrictions of Data 
Subject rights provided by Articles 12 to Articles 22, Union or Member State law which is 
limiting the data subject right “needs to respect the essence of the fundamental rights and 
freedoms and is a necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society to 
safeguard.“139 Respect of fundamental rights is already well established by the Charter and a 
restriction of fundamental rights is already limited by Article 52 of the Charter to the 
proportionality principle140. In the author’s opinion the national courts of MS should have 
reached different judgement, especially in the case of KPMG partner as Respect of private 
and family life is recognized by the Article 7 of the Charter.141   
Conclusion of section two 
From the analysis Section two of the thesis, we can see that the existence of vague and 
ambiguous terms such as those explained and explored in section one of the thesis are going 
to create a non-harmonious application of the GDPR. We have seen through the examples of 
the application of Google Spain142 ruling that courts show tendency to interpret vague and 
ambiguous terms and differently. The example of national courts interpreting Google Spain143 
ruling are proving the listed issues with GDPR. On the one hand, we can see that national 
courts of some Member states are applying Google Spain144 ruling in accordance with the 
Guidance145 and some MS are not, which is perfect example of existence of non-harmonious 
interpretation. Unfortunately, GDPR did not create any specific obligations to tackle this 
issue.  
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Conclusion  
This paper has explored the issues that GDPR may encounter while trying to achieve 
what it aims. As indicated already in the beginning of the paper, the aim of new GDPR is to 
create a harmonious legal framework which is going to be cost efficient. The content of 
GDPR is providing for long list of derogations where the competence to regulate area of data 
protection is shifted to the member states and thus GDPR creates legal diversity. Legal 
diversity is going to put additional financial on individuals and undertakings acting in the 
field of data protection.  
Derogations are also placed on the rights of data subjects which eventually lead to the 
creation of non-harmonious legal framework. Moreover, the rights of data subjects are 
subject to the interpretation of supervisory authorities and national courts of respective MS 
and the paper has shown the willingness of national courts to interpret and apply the 
reasoning of the CJEU differently. There are no indications within GDPR itself of principles 
that are going to be used in terms of striking balance between rights. This void is basis for 
different approaches and different application of data subject rights, especially right to be 
forgotten.  
The lack of provisions regulating users of social networks acting outside of household 
activity and uncertainty whether they can be understood as a data controllers under GDPR is 
creating additional void for interpretation. There is a possibility that Article 29 Working Party 
is going to adopt guidelines which will define more precisely approach of GDPR to this very 
specific issue, but we still have an issue of non-binding effect of such guidelines. In any case, 
it is reasonable to assume that this issue will be shifted to social network service providers, 
but this will create additional financial burden, which proves that new GDPR is not going to 
create cost efficiency within the social networks market.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 28 
 
Primary sources: 
- Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 
2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal 
data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC 
- Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 
1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data [1995] OJ 2 281/01 
 
Published articles and textbooks 
- Bernard C, The Substantive Law Of The EU (5th edn, Oxford University press 2016) 
- Brendan Van Alsenoy and others, 'Social Networks And Web 2.0: Are Users Also 
Bound By Data Protection Regulations?' (2009) 2 Identity in the Information Society. 
- William Long and Francesca Blythe, 'Member States’ Derogations Undermine The 
GDPR' (Privacy laws& business United Kingdom report 2016) 
- Article 29 Working Party - „Guidelines on the implementation of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union judgment on “Google Spain and inc v. Agencia Española de 
Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González” C-131/12” adopted on 26 
November 2014 
 
Online sources: 
 
- 'Priorities' (European Commission - European Commission, 2017) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities_en> accessed 23 May 2017 
- 'Better Access For Consumers And Business To Online Goods' (Digital Single 
Market, 2017) <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/node/78515> accessed 23 
May 2017 
- 'Digital Single Market' (Digital Single Market, 2017) <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-
single-market/en/digital-single-market> accessed 23 May 2017 
- 'Right Environment For Digital Networks And Services' (Digital Single Market, 2017) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/node/78516> accessed 23 May 2017 
- 'Economy & Society' (Digital Single Market, 2017) <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-
single-market/node/78517> accessed 23 May 2017 
- 'Web 2.0 - Definition Of Web 2.0 In English | Oxford Dictionaries' (Oxford 
Dictionaries | English, 2017) <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/Web_2.0> 
accessed 23 May 2017 
- 'Reform Of EU Data Protection Rules - European Commission' (Ec.europa.eu, 2017) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/reform/index_en.htm> accessed 12 May 
2017 
- 'Reform Of EU Data Protection Rules - European Commission' (Ec.europa.eu, 2017) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/reform/index_en.htm> accessed 12 May 
2017 
 29 
- 'Derogation - Definition Of Derogation In English | Oxford Dictionaries' (Oxford 
Dictionaries | English, 2017) 
<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/derogation> accessed 23 May 2017 
- 'Glossary - European Commission' (Ec.europa.eu, 2017) <http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/guidelines/ug_chap8_en.htm> accessed 23 May 2017 
- 'What Is Public Information? | Facebook Help Centre | Facebook' (Facebook.com, 
2017) <https://www.facebook.com/help/203805466323736> accessed 16 May 2017 
- 'How Does Facebook Suggest Tags? | Facebook Help Centre | Facebook' 
(Facebook.com, 2017) 
<https://www.facebook.com/help/122175507864081?helpref=faq_content> accessed 
11 May 2017. 
- 'France : The Right To Be Forgotten: First Decision Delivered In Application Of 
CJEU Jurisprudence' (Merlin.obs.coe.int, 2017) 
<http://merlin.obs.coe.int/iris/2015/4/article8.en.html> accessed 18 May 2017 
 
 
Table of cases: 
- Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección 
de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González [2014], ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 
- Franck J. v. Google France and Google Inc., TGI de Toulouse (urgent procedure), 21 
January 2015 
- Marie-France M. v. Google France and Google Inc., TGI de Paris (urgent procedure), 
24 November and 19 December 2014 
- Ewald van Hamersveld v. Google Inc., Amsterdam Court, 13 February 2015 
- Arthur van M. v. Google Netherlands and Google Inc., Amsterdam Court of Appeals, 
31 March 2015 
- Case C-2/88 J. J. Zwartveld and Others [1990] I-3372 
- Case C-101/1 Lindquist [2003] ECLI:EU:C:2003:596 
- Case C-6/64, Falminio Costa v. ENEL [1964] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The thesis is dedicated to my family and friends without whom author would not be able to 
complete it. For that reason author finds convenient to mention them by their names Fehrija, 
Fadil, Jasmin, Evin, Nico, Maria, Kelly, Armina and Nina. Additionally, the thesis is 
dedicated to all employees of the company NSoft d.o.o. Mostar, but especially to those who 
made this journey possible, Igor, Stjepko and Marina. 
